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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

which may remand to the special master, make a recommendation, or
issue a partial decree. The district court decision is appealable to the
state supreme court.
NSGWD first entered Gisler's water right proceedings with a
motion to alter or amend following Gisler's agreement with the IDWR
in an SF5 and the special master's endorsement of that agreement.
NSGWD argued that IDWR incorrectly utilized a flood irrigation
model rather than a sprinkler model when determining Gisler's water
right. The special master denied the motion, and NSGWD appealed
to the SRBA district court. The district court also denied the motion,
stating that NSGWD's late entry and attempt to enter factual
arguments into the proceedings were an attempt to circumvent the
procedural requirements of the IDWR. The district court found that
this was an improper forum for challenging IDWR's procedures and
that regardless, the factual arguments presented by NSGWD did not
demonstrate clear error. NSGWD subsequently appealed to the
supreme court.
The supreme court denied the motion and held that the timing
required by the IDWR process was well established, and that to permit
a party to object to an agreement after the fact was an unfair burden
on the claimant. By ignoring the steps outlined by IDWR, a party
endangers its ability to challenge a water right. Further, the court
found that the NSGWD on prior occasions attempted similar late
entries with motions to alter or amend, and the court advised NSGWD
of the impropriety of this practice. As such, the court found NSGWD's
appeals to be frivolous, unreasonable, and lacking a foundation in law.
The court awarded attorney fees and costs to Gisler.
Chris Cummins

ILLINOIS
Sparks v. Gray, No. 5-00-0382, 2002 WL 481567 (MII. App. Ct. Mar. 29,
2002) (holding a permanent injunction against adjacent property
landowners was an appropriate solution where a significant
accumulation of water on landowner's property was caused by the
addition of fill dirt on adjacent property and constituted a substantial
injury of a continuing nature).
Property owners, James and Margaret Sparks, sued adjoining
property owners, Donald and Virginia Gray, seeking injunctive relief
from the Grays spreading fill dirt on their property. The Circuit Court
of Madison County, Illinois granted the injunction, enjoining the
Grays from placing fill on their land. The Grays appealed to the Fifth
District of the Appellate Court of Illinois claiming the court was
incorrect in granting the injunction because the injury to plaintiff's
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land was neither substantial nor of a continuing nature.
The Sparks and the Grays owned adjoining lots in Pontoon Beach,
Illinois. Roads bordered the two lots on two sides, and a canal
bordered their properties on one side. The Grays' land also had
ditches on three sides that accommodated water runoff from Sparks'
property. The City of Pontoon Beach required all new construction to
be built on lots with an elevation of at least 417 feet above sea level.
The Grays' land was under this 417-foot requirement, while the Sparks'
property was 423 feet above sea level.
The Grays decided to procure a building permit for their property,
but knew that in order to do so, it was necessary to elevate the land to
the 417-foot level. To accomplish this, defendants brought in a large
supply of fill dirt to raise the elevation of their property. This increase
in elevation resulted in a reversal of the natural flow of rainwater and
caused water to accumulate on Sparks' property.
The issue in this case is whether the significant accumulation of
water on the Sparks' property constituted a substantial injury of a
continuing nature.
The Sparks requested a temporary and a
permanent injunction against the Grays, claiming the flooding of their
property caused irreparable harm for which they had no adequate
remedy at law. During the bench trial, the court heard expert
testimony that the fill on the Grays' property would affect flooding.
The court granted the Sparks' request for injunctive relief and
prevented the Grays' from spreading any more fill dirt on the
property.
The Grays appealed, claiming there was insufficient proof that
specific, substantial injury would have occurred unless the court
granted the injunction. The appellate court refused to substitute their
judgment for that of the trial court judge regarding the credibility of
the witnesses, and deferred to the trial court's factual findings as well.
The court noted the trial judge, after hearing the witnesses and
examining the property herself, determined the Spark's injury was
substantial enough to grant the injunctive relief requested. The court
then reviewed the record and agreed with the trial court judge,
holding the evidence and reasonable inferences there from supported
a finding of substantial injury. The appellate court ultimately found
that, because the significant water accumulation on Sparks' property
constituted an injury of a continuing nature, there was no adequate
remedy at law and affirmed the trial court's grant of permanent
injunction.
Note: At the time of publication, The Appellate Court of Illinois for
the Fifth District reheard the case and reversed its previous decision.
The court held that, because the Grays' actions only result in the
displacement of water and did not result in impeding its natural flow;
the Sparks failed to prove they possess a clear and protectable interest
entitling them to an injunction. 777 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
David W Hall

